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Treaty-making involves the constitutional struggle for policy control. Both Congress and the 
presdient are defined as official actors in the making of international commitments, and both 
closely guard their constitutionally defined roles. Yet extant scholarship generally concludes 
Congress rarely matters in establishing U.S. formal commitments abroad. Indeed, it is frequently 
pointed out that only 21 treaties have been voted down by the U.S. Senate in its 230 year 
existence. While true, such a figure presents an incomplete picture of congressional influence. 
Presidents may covet greater institutional capacity to direct unilaterally U.S. foreign policy, but 
opposition in both the House and Senate frequently reins in an uncompromising White House. In 
this paper we compare the international commitments made by Presidents George W. Bush 
(2001-2004) and Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909). We find the Senate’s role in influencing 
and/or altering treaties has been under-estimated in most analyses. While the Senate rarely 
rejects a treaty negotiated by the president with a recorded floor vote, the Senate can and does 
attach amendments and reservations to treaties that affect U.S. obligations and responsibilities. 
More importantly, though, and even less recognized are treaties killed by the Senate through 
inaction. At least 21 treaties during Roosevelt’s administration were rejected by the Senate, none 
of them by a formal floor vote. By ignoring Senate influence before an official floor vote risks 
under-estimating the influence the Senate has on U.S. commitments abroad. This paper also 
explores the domestic political authority under which presidents negotiate international 
agreements. Most scholars conclude that international agreements signal unilateral presidential 
power. Yet, many are negotiated pursuant to congressional statutes or previously ratified treaties. 
In both cases, Congress maintains influence over the process.  
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Has not the famous political fable of the snake, with two heads and one body, 
some useful instruction contained in it? She was going to a brook to drink, and in 
her way was to pass through a hedge, a twig of which opposed her direct course; 
one head chose to go on the right side of the twig, the other on the left; so that 
time was spent in the contest, and before the decision was completed, the poor 






The Framers developed a political compact that harnessed the human inclination for 
power in order to serve the public good.  To this end, the U.S. Constitution put in place a general 
framework for governance by dividing power between institutions with overlapping 
jurisdictions.  The design induces competition among power holders that promotes a political 
environment largely characterized by a methodical pace and compromise.  However, the 
Framers’ political solution was purposefully left incomplete.  In effect, the Constitution set in 
motion a continuous struggle for institutional power (Moe and Howell 1999).  The powers 
channeled through the Constitution would not remain static as political leaders sought to expand 
their own power at the expense of institutional rivals.  Recently, this dynamic has been most 
evident with the expansion of presidential power in the areas of foreign affairs and national 
security.   
One such example illustrates nicely this inter-institutional struggle arising from 
constitutional ambiguity. On the heals of the September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush 
ordered the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct wireless surveillance of potential 
terrorists. One tactic of the NSA program allegedly utilized information from national 
telecommunication companies in order to seek out the international communications of U.S. 
citizens without a warrant to do so. Interestingly, the Bush administration has offered a two-part 
rationale justifying its executive authority to conduct the NSA surveillance program.1 According 
to the administration, Congress provided statutory authorization for the program in the post-9/11 
use of force resolution. In addition, the administration maintains that the president’s power to run 
the NSA program derives from his role as commander-in-chief.  Importantly, the latter rationale 
suggests that such activities are beyond the reach of congressional statute. Not surprisingly, 
Congress sought to push back a bit once the president’s program grabbed national headlines.  
The congressional reaction was led by Senate Judiciary Chairman, Arlen Specter (R-PA).2  
Senator Specter originally sought a legislative solution to ensure some form of judicial review of 
the NSA program by the FISA Court which was established and ultimately overseen by 
Congress.  However, a legislative solution of that sort seems unlikely at this point.  For one, most 
                                                 
1 The Bush Administration actually wanted to have it both ways. First, the administration defended the NSA 
program as legal based implicitly (not explicitly) on the congressional authorization to use force after 9/11. 
However, simultaneously, President Bush claimed the inherent right to order such activities even without 
congressional assent. Interestingly and perhaps more to the point, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales admits that the 
Bush Administration did not seek congressional authority for the program because of anticipated opposition from 
many Republicans on the Hill. 
2  Vice President Dick Cheney successfully lobbied enough Judiciary Republicans to shut down Chairman Specter’s 
attempt to conduct a closed session investigation into the role of the telephone companies (Perine 2006a, CQ 
Weekly, pg. 1629).    
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of Senator Specter’s Republican colleagues don’t want to provoke an intra-party clash with the 
president given the approaching midterm elections.3 Moreover, the Bush administration has 
explicitly challenged any legislation that would undermine its power to conduct the NSA 
program. Indeed, Cheney wrote to Specter “The president ultimately will have to make a decision 
whether any particular legislation would strengthen the ability of the government to protect 
Americans against terrorists” (Perine 2006b, pg. 1968).  One possible interpretation of these 
events is that the president’s use of unilateral action directing the NSA program has the effect of 
establishing a new policy status quo which will now be defended by the executive branch. 
 Interestingly, a century before the Bush Administration, another president took office 
seeking greater institutional capacity. Theodore Roosevelt also believed in a strong executive 
branch.4 His administration frequently ignored Congress in foreign policy decision-making and 
defended such unilateral actions as necessary for an emerging great power. “The biggest matters, 
Roosevelt wrote, “such as the Portsmouth peace, the acquisition of Panama, and sending the fleet 
around the world, I managed without consultation with anyone; for when a matter is of capital 
importance, it is well to have it handled by one man only” (quoted in John Milton Cooper,. 75). 
Roosevelt went so far as to add his own corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and with it Roosevelt 
not only re-stated the U.S. goal of minimizing European influence in the Western Hemisphere, 
but more importantly he insisted that a president possessed the unilateral authority to enforce 
such a policy (Fisher 1995).5  
Constitutional ambiguity extends to many aspects of foreign affairs. Treaty-making, in 
particular, involves the constitutional struggle for policy control. Both institutions are defined as 
official actors in the making of international commitments, and both closely guard their 
constitutionally defined roles. Yet extant scholarship generally concludes Congress rarely 
matters in establishing U.S. formal commitments abroad. Indeed, it is frequently pointed out that 
only 21 treaties have been voted down by the U.S. Senate in its 230 year existence. While true, 
such a figure presents an incomplete picture of congressional influence. Presidents may covet 
greater institutional capacity to direct unilaterally U.S. foreign policy, but opposition in both the 
House and Senate frequently reins in an uncompromising White House.  
In this paper we compare the international commitments made by Presidents George W. 
Bush (2001-2004) and Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909). First, we examine Senate opposition or 
support for treaties negotiated by the president. We find Senate power to be much greater when 
earlier phases of the treaty-making process are examined. Second, while treaty-making in general 
has received significant scholarly attention, much less is known about the international 
agreements negotiated by U.S. presidents. However, any general assessment of U.S. 
commitments must include these agreements in the analysis. Further, given the large number of 
agreements signed by presidents, few analyses have investigated the issues involved in the 
bilateral and multilateral agreements made by presidents. A survey of these issues enables a 
more refined and definite assessment of presidential decision-making. Lastly, this paper explores 
the domestic political authority under which presidents negotiate international agreements. Most 
scholars conclude that international agreements signal unilateral presidential power. Yet, many 
                                                 
3  Also, Intelligence Chairman Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) has warned that he will assert his committee’s jurisdiction over 
any such bill that is reported out of the Judiciary Committee (Perine 2006b). 
4 One sees parallels in the attitudes of Roosevelt and Bush towards Congressional power. Weak presidents in the 
latter half of the 19th century enabled the Senate to dominate many aspects of foreign policy. Roosevelt, and later 
Wilson, attempted to reassert presidential power (Holt, 1933).  
5 President James Monroe never asserted the constitutional right to implement his doctrine without congressional 
authority. 
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are negotiated pursuant to congressional statutes or previously ratified treaties. In both cases, 
Congress maintains influence over the process.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the requirements for legally binding 
international commitments. This involves norms and rules negotiated at the international level, 
but more importantly it involves the constitutional division of power between the executive and 
legislative branches in the U.S. Then, we discuss the constitutional, political, and electoral bases 
for executive foreign policy power. Not only do presidents seek to avoid congressional 
constraints on foreign policy decision-making, but Congress itself has its own institutional 
limitations that inhibit vigorous challenges of presidential authority. We next discuss the treaty 
and international agreement data collected for Presidents Bush and Roosevelt. We summarize the 
foreign commitments of both administrations and congressional influence over such 
commitments. We conclude by offering directions for future research. 
 
International Commitments under a Separation of Powers System 
 
Now the irreparable mistake of our Constitution puts it into the power of one-
third+1 of the Senate to meet with a categorical veto any treaty negotiated by the 




International and U.S. domestic law differ importantly on the types of legally binding 
inter-state commitments available to heads of state. International law makes no distinction 
between treaties and other forms of agreements between nations. In fact, according to 
international law a treaty is by definition any legally binding contract between the signatory 
nations. The form of the arrangement actually matters less than the substance and thus any non-
trivial agreement designed to be binding on the parties that clearly specifies obligations 
represents a treaty under international law (CRS 2001). In the United States, however, only 
international agreements that go to the Senate for advice and consent signify treaties. Any other 
deals negotiated by the president with foreign nations are identified as executive agreements and 
do not require Senate participation. This distinction, while meaningless to international law, is 
clearly critical in the U.S. since it implicitly establishes a constitutional understanding about the 
distribution of foreign policy power among the political branches of government. 
During the Nixon Administration, the United States participated in a conference in 
Vienna designed to codify international law with respect to treaties. While delegates from the 
U.S. signed the negotiated convention, the U.S. Senate failed to act on it. When President Nixon 
transmitted the document to the Senate in 1971, he encouraged a prompt advice and consent 
process since the treaty in his opinion was important to “the progressive development and 
codification of international law” (CRS 2001, 377). The U.S. State Department also encouraged 
swift ratification and noted in its transmittal letter that “the convention sets forth a generally 
agreed body of rules to govern all aspects of treaty making and treaty observance” (CRS 2001, 
379). The convention further reaffirms the principle of pacta sunt servanda (promises must be 
kept), a principle supported by most nations including the United States. The U.S. Senate, 
however, views the agreed upon language in the treaty as a threat to its constitutional role in the 
foreign policy process.  
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The Vienna Convention does not distinguish treaties from other types of international 
agreements.  As such, ratification of the document would effectively enable presidents to 
circumvent the Senate when negotiating foreign commitments and consequently obliterate a 
critical constitutional process designed to check power. Since Article VI of the U.S. Constitution 
considers treaties to be part of the “supreme law of the land” any conflation of treaty-making and 
agreement-signing provides a legal justification for presidents to eliminate Senate participation 
entirely in the establishing of international commitments.6 Despite both precedent and the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of executive agreements as binding contracts with foreign nations 
that must be respected in U.S. domestic law, concern remains that the absence of Senate 
participation in the formation of an international agreement will at some point invalidate these 
commitments.  
To avoid the possibility of a constitutional challenge as well as ensure a continued role in 
the treaty-making process, the U.S. Senate amended the language of the Vienna Convention to 
consider only agreements advised and consented to by the Senate to be valid treaties (CRS 2001, 
21).  The State Department and the White House oppose such a change and have refused to ratify 
the amended document. Interestingly, the constitutional ambiguity in treaty-making authority in 
the U.S. and specific language in the Vienna Convention create significant difficulties for U.S. 
ratification. The Vienna document considers treaties to be null and void if they “violate an 
internal law of fundamental importance” (Henkin 1996, 499). The Senate insists that Article II, 
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution must be considered of fundamental importance to internal law. 
If so, then ratification of the convention would presumably imperil every commitment made by 
the United States without advice and consent of the Senate.  
The U.S. Senate further objects to the Convention’s language regarding both recognized 
norms of international behavior and its acceptance of treaty reservations. The principle of jus 
cogens (compelling law) establishes that agreements, which violate fundamental principles of 
international law, must be considered invalid and thus non-binding. What constitutes such norms 
remains uncertain and the U.S. Senate refuses to accept the basic principle if the Convention 
cannot define clearly how such values arise and the body responsible for such decisions (CRS 
2001).  
What’s more, the Convention accepts as legitimate international agreements that prohibit 
domestic legislatures from attaching reservations or amendments to the final negotiated product 
(CRS 2001). The U.S. Senate refuses to acknowledge such limitations on its advice and consent 
responsibilities. Indeed, if the Senate was to accept such language, then presumably presidents 
would increasingly insist treaties be subject to only up or down votes on the Senate floor. The 
U.S. Supreme Court then might be willing to legitimate such executive behavior if the Senate 
had agreed in principle to tying its own hands through a ratified treaty.  
                                                 
6 Treaties actually take the force of law after a president has proclaimed them, although in certain rare circumstances 
implementing legislation passed by Congress is required and thus some treaties do not enter into force until such 
legislation is signed into law by the president (CRS 2001).  
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Treaty-Making in the U.S. Constitution 
 
The individual Senators evidently consider the prerogative of the Senate as far 




Constitutional ambiguity in treaty-making authority reflects early uncertainty about how 
foreign policy power should more generally be distributed within a republic. Records of the 
constitutional convention in Philadelphia of 1787 show that the treaty-making requirements 
finalized in the governing document received little debate. Not only were the framers unsure of 
how to divide foreign policy powers across institutions, but they also disagreed on the 
distinctions between international and purely domestic affairs. Since the Crown historically had 
been responsible for foreign affairs, local governing units in the colonies had little experience to 
draw upon for establishing clear lines of authority in the founding document. Further, the framers 
were conflicted over whether the relevant lesson learned was the inability of the U.S. 
government to conduct foreign policy under the Articles of Confederation or the excessive 
authority granted the Crown and Parliament to direct the affairs of the colonies. The Articles, for 
example, did not provide for a division of foreign policy authority since the executive, 
legislative, and judicial power were all housed in a single branch of government. But, the framers 
also acknowledged that any division of authority among separate institutions might jeopardize a 
government’s ability to honor its commitments (Holt 1933). 
While an early draft of the Constitution conferred treaty-making power entirely to the 
Senate, the framers eventually agreed that this power, like so many others, should be shared 
among institutions (Farrand 1967). Indeed, apprehension quickly emerged among the delegates 
about the disproportionate influence states would have over the treaty-making process under 
such a system. Subsequent drafts therefore enhanced the role of the executive (a more national 
perspective) even as the House of Representatives remained excluded from this policy arena 
(Holt 1933).7 Still, Hamilton was careful to strike a balance of power among institutions to allay 
fears of power concentration.  In The Federalist No. 69  he contrasted the U.S. arrangement with 
that of Great Britain. “The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative of the 
nation in all foreign transactions…there is no comparison between the intended power of the 
President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the 
other can only do with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature.” The framers also 
eliminated the distinction between foreign and domestic policy, making both the law of the land 
and both subject to institutional limitations.  
The distinction between treaties and executive agreements also received little if any 
debate in Philadelphia. Still, the power to make foreign commitments has been a source of 
                                                 
7 The framers generally agreed that the House could not satisfy the demands of secrecy and expediency involved in 
treaty-making (Holt 1933, 7). This in no way means that members of the House accepted their second-class status in 
foreign policy. Any funds appropriated for the implementation of an international commitment must be signed off 
by the House of Representatives. In the late 19th century, the House forced a legislative change to the procedures 
governing Indian nations in the United States and effectively prevented the treaty power from being used to exclude 
the House from such domestic considerations. Further, in 1945 the House proposed a constitutional amendment that 
would have included it in any treaty deliberations along with the Senate. The Senate, however, failed to act on the 
amendment (CRS 2001).  
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institutional and partisan competition for most U.S. history. Oddly, it seems that an ambiguity in 
constitutional language has generated this foreign policy controversy. Article II, Section 2 clearly 
states presidents negotiate with the advice and consent of the Senate. Yet, Article I, Section 10 
appears to suggest that there is more than one form of international contract, thus opening the 
constitutional door to executive agreements. The third clause of the section reads, “No State 
shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War 
in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign 
Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit 
of delay.” While Section 10 of Article I deals exclusively with powers prohibited of states, the 
language used does arguably recognize pacts with foreign countries other than treaties (CRS 
2001). Importantly, though, it is never explicitly stated whether such agreements can be made by 
the president or without congressional consent.     
The controversy additionally arises from the framers’ failure to anticipate institutional 
and partisan conflict over international commitments. The delegates at the Constitutional 
Convention did not even consider the possibility of an impasse between a president and the 
Senate over control of foreign policy. The primary issue of importance was preventing the 
accumulation of power in any single branch of government and not a consideration of whether 
such institutional protections would effectively preclude treaty-making (Holt 1933, 12). 
Certainly divided control of the executive and Senate might result in a treaty going down to 
defeat for electoral reasons and not necessarily due to a fair assessment of the value of the 
agreement. Both the ratification of SALT II and the reinterpretation of the ABM treaty, for 
example, became intensely partisan and as a result both also became issues in presidential 
elections. While executive agreements, rather than treaties, may be negotiated by presidents for a 
number of reasons, arguably the anticipation of Senate opposition influences the ultimate foreign 
policy path chosen.  
Despite the constitutional competition, or perhaps because of it, clear criteria have yet to 
be accepted by both the president and the Senate as to when advice and consent is legally and or 
politically required. The State Department has admittedly generated a set of principles for 
determining whether a foreign commitment should be established using an executive agreement 
or treaty, with congressional preferences ranked number five on the list (CRS 2001). However, 
the White House can ignore these criteria as well as the State Department’s recommendation. 
While the State Department advises frequent consultation with Congress in the establishing of 
foreign commitments, presidents have increasingly negotiated compacts using executive 
agreements and this seemingly has only exacerbated the constitutional struggle.  
 
The Use and Abuse of Executive Agreements 
 
“The constitutionally and historically sanctioned distinction between the treaty as 
the proper instrument for contracting important, substantive agreements and the 
executive agreement as an instrument for the conduct of routine and essentially 
nonpolitical business with foreign countries has now all but disappeared.”   
 
-J. William Fulbright 
 
The use of executive agreements has clearly changed over time. Initially employed for 
minor modifications to treaties already in existence, executive agreements have become the 
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primary instrument used by presidents to establish inter-state compacts. In the 19th century, 
treaties were as common, if not more common, than executive agreements. The U.S. State 
Department reports 60 treaties and 27 executive agreements between 1789 and 1839. More to the 
point, however, the agreements negotiated in the 19th and early 20th centuries were rarely 
employed for substantively important contracts. In 1868, for example, an executive agreement 
with Bavaria was signed that clarified ambiguities in a naturalization treaty. Reciprocity 
copyright agreements were also done frequently without the advice and consent of the Senate. In 
both instances, however, the executive’s ability to make such arrangements was based on a 
previous treaty or pursuant to legislation passed by Congress.8 But by the 20th century, presidents 
such as McKinley, Taft, and Theodore Roosevelt had increasingly begun to use executive 
agreements on matters of significant importance (Margolis 1986, 38).     
One of the most notable executive incursions occurred at the outset of World War II 
(Church 1969). With the fall of France in 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt sought to bolster 
Great Britain in the face of an imminent German onslaught.  Through executive agreement, 
Roosevelt traded fifty outdated destroyers in exchange for key British naval bases in the Western 
Hemisphere.9 Given the great urgency, Roosevelt felt compelled to utilize the executive 
agreement instead of waiting for a Senate advice and consent. Although the unique wartime 
situation may have shaped his decision to use an executive agreement, he purposefully never 
placed such a limitation on his power. Rather, Roosevelt directed his Attorney General to draft a 
legal defense justifying his action based on constitutional prerogatives. This established an 
important precedent in the use of executive agreements for future presidents who would use this 
tool for further incursions into what previously had been claimed as Congress’s constitutional 
authority. 
As U.S. military and economic power has grown, so too has U.S. foreign commitments. 
Not only do the number of treaties and executive agreements in the second half of the 20th 
century increase rather dramatically, but ever more the Senate is removed from the process.  In 
1942, for example, six treaties and 52 executive agreements were signed. By 1976, the numbers 
soar to over 400 executive agreements and 13 treaties. The executive agreements now, however, 
are more substantively important and increasingly based on a president’s sole constitutional 
authority as commander in chief. Status of forces agreements, as well as the delimitation of 
strategic objectives, are frequently established through a president’s unique constitutional 
charges. The shift toward executive agreements carrying more substantive issues of international 
commitments did not go unnoticed in the halls of Congress.  On this point, Senator J. William 
Fulbright (D-Ark.) Chairman of Foreign Relations noted that:  “The Senate is asked to convene 
solemnly to approve by a two-thirds vote a treaty to preserve cultural artifacts in a friendly 
neighboring country.  At the same time, the chief executive is moving military men and material 
around the globe like so many pawns in a chess game” (quoted in Johnson 1984, 6).     
Given the use of executive agreements and the president’s first-mover advantage in 
treaty-making, the Senate, and Congress more generally, appear to have little influence over U.S 
diplomacy. Only 21 treaties have been defeated with a voice vote on the floor of the Senate and 
                                                 
8 Admittedly, some executive agreements in the 19th century covered significant matters. President Monroe 
negotiated a compact with Great Britain to reduce armaments on the Great Lakes in 1817. Monroe, however, 
inquired with the Senate about whether advice and consent was required. The Senate later gave it (McClure, 1941).  
9 The executive agreement made by FDR was of great import.  In fact, Winston Churchill suggests that the 
agreement committed the U.S. to war.  Churchill argued that the agreement provided Germany the legal grounds 
necessary for declaring war on the U.S. (Church 1969).   
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only 7 in the 20th century, 3 in the post-World War II era. At the same time, President Bush 
signed 195 executive agreements in 2004 compared to only 4 treaties. These figures appear to 
present a president scarcely hampered by Senate constitutional concerns.  
These figures are likely misleading, however. The Senate has alternative ways of 
influencing treaties other than formal floor votes. At times the Senate will attach amendments, 
reservations, understandings, declarations, or provisos to treaties to ensure the language in the 
document reflects its members’ preferences. Some of these conditions may require resubmission 
to the other party for acceptance, while others simply express the Senate’s interpretation or 
opinion of U.S. obligations.10 As early as 1803, the Senate killed a treaty by attaching an 
amendment Great Britain refused to accept. More recently, when the U.S. Senate gave its advice 
and consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, it made sure to attach conditions 
protecting the civil liberties of American citizens (CRS 2001).11 The Senate also may kill treaties 
by failing to act on the document submitted by the president. The agreement then languishes in 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee until it is renegotiated by the president or sent back to 
the State Department by the Senate. President Woodrow Wilson signed a treaty for the 
advancement of peace with the Dominican Republic in 1917. While the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee reported the treaty favorably to the Senate, no final action was taken and the treaty 
was sent back to the Secretary of State in 1935 (Wiktor, 1979).  
Evidence also appears to indicate that Congress has more influence over executive 
agreements than previously acknowledged. Most agreements are based at least in part on 
previous treaties or statutes passed by Congress (CRS 2001). Accession of new members to 
multilateral treaties is typically accomplished through an executive agreement, but authorized by 
the original treaty. Similarly, many foreign assistance programs are established through 
executive agreement but pursuant to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act legislated by Congress. 
Further, presidents at times seek to define foreign commitments through congressional-executive 
agreements, rather than treaties. With these types of international agreements, both houses of 
Congress get a say, but importantly only a bare majority in each chamber is required for 
ratification and not the two-thirds needed for a treaty. Many free-trade agreements are 
established with this process to avoid narrow economic interests gathering one-third of the 
Senate to oppose reductions in tariffs.  
Only a small percentage of agreements are signed pursuant to a president’s constitutional 
powers or obligations. A study by the Congressional Research Service (2001, 5) reports at least 5 
constitutional arguments used to legitimate sole executive agreements. The justification used by 
the executive branch include executive authority (Article II, Section 1), commander in chief 
power (Article II, Section 2), the treaty clause (Article II, Section 2), the authority to receive 
ambassadors (Article II, Section 3), and the president’s charge to “take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed” (Article II, Section 3).  While the legality of executive agreements pursuant 
to independent presidential authority has been established by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
uncertainty remains whether such compacts can supplant an act of Congress (CRS 2001, 5).  
 
                                                 
10 The Senate has repeatedly made clear that any interpretation of a treaty must conform to the “common 
understanding shared by the President and the Senate at the time the Senate gave its advice and consent to 
ratification” (CRS 2001, p. 14).  President Reagan met stiff Senate opposition when he tried to reinterpret the 1972 
ABM Treaty.  
11 Given the potential for intrusive inspections under the convention and the possible seizure of property, the Senate 
expressed a concern for 4th and 5th amendment protections guaranteed to U.S. citizens. 
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The Politics of Unilateral Action in Foreign Policy 
 
The contest for ages has been to rescue liberty from the grasp of executive power. 
 
- Daniel Webster 
 
 For decades, scholars in American politics have sought to explain the surge of power in 
the modern presidency (Schlesinger 1973; Neustadt 1990; Light 1994; Pfiffner 1996; Kernell 
1997; Genovese 2001). Neustadt’s (1960) classic work offered an answer. The personal 
presidency became the dominant paradigm on presidential power. Rather than formal 
mechanisms, executive power was rooted in the president’s ability to bargain and/or persuade.  
But absent the executive’s ability to bargain or persuade members of Congress, how can 
presidents achieve their political and policy ends? There is a growing literature that has begun to 
move beyond the Neustadtian explanation of power toward the role of unilateral tools. Indeed, 
this literature has shown that presidents have increasingly relied upon actions like executive 
orders, proclamations, national security directives, and executive agreements to circumvent 
Congress (Mayer 2001; Howell 2005; Cooper 2002; Margolis 1986).   
The power of unilateral executive action is quite different from Neustadt’s framework of 
presidential power (Howell 2005). For one, unilateral action allows the president to act alone 
without the need of congressional cooperation. In terms of executive agreements, the president 
can initiate policy commitments with little concern for congressional preferences. In addition, 
acting first allows the president to control the agenda and establish a new status quo. Once a 
commitment is made by executive agreement, Congress is faced with a fait accompli from which 
they can either acquiesce or take on the collective burden of a statutory response.  Even more, 
presidents know the latter are open to multiple veto points in which they need to find support in 
only one to successfully block a congressional challenge.      
Presidents have both the opportunity and incentive to exploit constitutional ambiguity 
with unilateral action, especially in the realm of foreign policy. As we have mentioned, the 
constitution does not offer enough explicit clarification as to the circumstances in which the 
president’s power ends and Congress’s begins in the making of international commitments (and 
other powers for that matter). Instead, this is determined through the ongoing practice of politics 
(Moe and Howell 1999). And although the president has the responsibility to carry out laws 
assigned by the legislature, this charge does not make him Congress’s agent. Congress does not 
have the ability to hire or fire and can’t take away or restructure the powers of the executive to 
make him do their bidding. The president’s authority is independent and coequal to that of 
Congress. Add to this the extraordinary advantage in resources and expertise that presidents 
enjoy in foreign policy through the departments of State and Defense, the NSC, and the 
Intelligence Community to name just a few.  Moreover, the nature of executive power means that 
presidents maintain direct discretion over decisions and the operation of government.  This 
discretion works to the president’s advantage best in foreign policy. The relative lack of 
codification and regulation in foreign policy (as compared to domestic policy) offers the 
president far greater latitude to exert power independently of Congress (Smith 1994). If Congress 
aspires to control the executive, they could hardly have been dealt a more difficult hand.    
Presidents also have a stronger incentive to accrue power. Inevitably, presidents must 
actively pursue reelection and policy. But their emphasis tends to be on establishing a positive 
historical legacy as strong leaders. They have relatively little time to reign over an immense 
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executive office and affect outcomes, so they must pursue and expand their power more 
aggressively than other office holders. Not surprisingly, the most important currency for 
presidents comes from policy movement, while for Congress the currency of position taking can 
often serve reelection just as well (Mayhew 1974). In addition, as the country’s economic and 
political roles grew more complex during the 20th century, the public increasingly demanded 
proactive governmental responses (Moe and Howell 1999). Presidents expanded their office and 
powers to meet these public expectations more so than other institutions. Presidents like 
Theodore Roosevelt understood this dynamic very well.  Roosevelt wanted a “big America” and 
saw the presidency as a way to unlock the country’s potential (Morris 2001). Indeed, Congress 
(and the Court) not only acquiesced, but seemingly were complicit in enabling the president to 
take the lead.   
The constitution provides Congress with the power to both directly shape foreign policy, 
and to constrain presidential actions. The congressional powers such as the ability to declare war, 
raise and maintain the armed forces, make the rules governing those forces, and regulate 
commerce with foreign nations are testament to the Framers’ intention that Congress was to play 
a significant role. Yet, the threshold for congressional assertiveness and participation is much 
higher in foreign policy as compared to domestic politics. Congress’s reelection imperative is 
more readily served through domestic policy where it can claim significant reelection benefits.          
Although Congress has noticed the waning of the treaty and its commitment authority 
relative to the executive branch, it has been largely unable to collectively challenge this assault 
on its power.  There were at least two noteworthy instances when Congress did attempt to push 
back against presidential discretion in the making of international commitments. The first 
instance occurred in the early 1950s and was known as the Bricker revolt (Johnson 1984).  
Senator John W. Bricker (R-OH) led the attack with a proposed amendment to the Constitution 
that sought to ensure all executive agreements would be regulated by Congress and require 
congressional action. The coalition of supporters (e.g. the Brickerites) included mostly 
conservative Republicans and southern Democrats.  Ideologically, the Brickerites had a deep 
distaste for New Deal internationalism. They opposed U.S. involvement in the U.N. and other 
international organizations. It was certainly true that the Bricker amendment would outlaw 
unilateral executive agreements of the FDR destroyers-for-bases variety. But more than anything 
else, the Bricker proposal offered a formidable defense of states’ rights. Their concerns seemed 
justified in that recent Supreme Court decisions signaled an expansion of executive discretion 
and a decay of state control over domestic law relative to treaties and agreements.12 Indeed, one 
argument getting significant political traction at the time was the fear of desegregation imposed 
by an executive agreement made with an African ally. The Eisenhower administration fought this 
challenge head-on with the help of the Senate Republican leadership.  President Eisenhower 
countered with the bully-pulpit turning the debate into one revolving around the necessity for 
federal sovereignty and unity in foreign affairs in order to protect national interests and to keep 
the peace.  The administration was able to successfully water down and eventually beat back the 
Bricker legislation which failed by a single vote.   
The second major attempt to contain presidential power in the area of international 
commitments was partially successful (Johnson 1984). The Case-Zablocki Act occurred toward 
the end of the Vietnam War. Reacting to the president’s disastrous military foray in Southeast 
Asia, a coalition known as the neo-isolationists formed making “no more Vietnams” their 
rallying cry. The neo-isolationists were ideologically distinct from the Brickerites that challenged 
                                                 
12  See for example Misssouri v. Holland (252 U.S. 416, 1920) and U.S. v. Pink (315 U.S. 203, 1942). 
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presidential power two decades earlier in that they saw some usefulness in the UN and other 
multinational organizations like NATO. The real fear for neo-isolationists was the unchecked 
executive discretion over military operations in regions not vital to U.S. national interests. 
According to Senator Church, “Our gravest mistakes in the last twenty years have come from the 
assumption that we have the wealth and power to mold the world to our own liking” (quoted in 
Johnson 1984, 117). By the 1960s, Congress was not capable of countering the extensive number 
of executive commitments made. In fact, Congress was so inept in terms of oversight that it often 
didn’t even know of the commitments made by the president. By late summer of 1972, the neo-
isolationists led by Senators J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), Sam Ervin (D-NC), Frank Church 
(D-Idaho), and Clifford Case (R-NJ) had passed the Case-Zablocki Act.  This legislation 
required the Department of State to report all statutory and executive agreements to Congress 
within sixty days. Case-Zablocki was considerably less ambitious than the Bricker amendment, 
but the Act did restore some power back to Congress in terms of agreement-making.            
 Despite the limited success of the Case-Zablocki Act, the reliance on executive 
agreements continues to grow. Indeed, the value of these tools in terms of making commitments 
far outweighs any costs in reporting by presidents.  Johnson’s (1984) classic study suggests that 
the treaty procedure is no longer the primary instrument of international commitments. Rather, 
his work shows that statutory commitments have been relied upon extensively during much of 
the Cold War period.  But in addition, Johnson does find an increasing trend in the use of 
executive agreements. In fact, more recent studies show a continual trend toward the use of 
executive agreements over time.  Figure 1 provides an illustration of this trend. The figure 
combines our data from Roosevelt (1901-1909) and Bush (2001-2004) with that of five 
presidential administrations collected in Johnson’s analysis (1946-1973).   
 




The previous discussion leads to a number of testable conjectures, some that can be 
examined with the data available and some that must wait for further data collection. First, we 
anticipate a dramatic increase in the use of executive agreements relative to treaties moving from 
the administration of Roosevelt to Bush. This change in foreign policy tools flows not only from 
the leadership role the U.S. took up after World War II, but also results from presidents seeking 
fewer constraints on its commitment-making. Second, recent research shows increasing 
reservations added to treaties by the U.S. Senate. We anticipate a similar trend and thus expect 
more treaties to have reservations introduced by the Senate during the Bush rather than the 
Roosevelt Administration. While such add-ons to treaties signal Senate influence, we also 
consider most datasets examining such a relationship incomplete. That is, few if any studies 
include treaties that did not ultimately go into force. Without these cases, however, a skewed 
picture of Senate behavior is presented. With unperfected treaties included in the dataset, we 
expect Senate influence to be considerably greater than extant scholarship reports. Third, we 
expect commitments to increasingly focus on economic concerns. Lastly, although we anticipate 
large numbers of executive agreements by the Bush Administration, we expect most to be 
pursuant to congressional statutes. Unfortunately, this last expectation is one we are unable to yet 
fully explore do to data limitations.  
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Data and Methods 
 
The data used in the following analyses comes from many sources. First, a compilation of 
treaties and agreements collected by William Malloy for the U.S. Senate is used for the 
administration of Theodore Roosevelt. This two volume manuscript published by the 
government printing office in 1910 covers treaties and international agreements signed by 
presidents and other representatives of the U.S. government from 1776 until 1909. This 
document provides the primary source of all treaties and agreements entered into by the U.S. 
during the Roosevelt Administration (1901-1909).  
Treaties that failed to enter into force are recorded by Christian Wiktor. His many volume 
set of unperfected treaties contains basic information on compacts negotiated by the United 
States, but for one reason or another did not become the law of the land. Wiktor includes the 
actual text of the unperfected treaties and a brief summary of how and why the negotiated pact 
did not get proclaimed by the president. The entire compilation extends from 1776 until 1976 
and includes hundreds of treaties that failed to enter into force. 
The U.S. State Department provides information on current treaties and international 
agreements. From its website, one can obtain a list of international agreements organized by 
foreign power and a very brief explanation of the commitment entered into. These agreements 
cab be found in the link to Treaty Actions under the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. 
Department of State. While limited, treaty actions for 1997 through 2005 are available in 
electronic format. 
The Library of Congress website (THOMAS) supplements the international agreements 
found at the State Department with treaties signed and submitted to the U.S. Senate by 
presidents. The easy to use search engine makes available all treaties transmitted to the U.S. 
Senate from the 90th through the 109th Congresses. Information on committee and floor action is 
included and whether the treaty received the advice and consent to ratification. The one 
drawback of this datasource is that THOMAS only records treaty actions once they have been 
transmitted to the Senate by the president. Therefore, any treaties negotiated but not yet in Senate 
hands seemingly are absent from the THOMAS database. In practice, however, this limitation 
should not be much of a problem since the time from signing to Senate transmittal is typically 
short. Still, it is possible that a few treaties do not make it into the dataset used in the analyses 
below because, while negotiated and signed by the president, the documents have yet to reach 




U.S. Senate behavior is captured using multiple indicators. Any reservations, 
understandings, or amendments to treaties offered by the Senate are measured for both the 
administrations of Roosevelt and Bush. Advice and consent to ratification by the full Senate is 
recorded as are actions taken by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on treaties during the 
Bush Administration. A dummy variable for Senate influence is generated from the previously 
described information. For the Roosevelt years, information on treaties that did not go into force 




Two issue codings have been created for treaties and agreements included in the dataset. 
The codes provided by the Library of Congress (THOMAS) form the basis for this variable. 
However, additional issue areas were generated for treaties and agreements that did not fall 
easily into the THOMAS categories. From this set of 34 issue codes, a second variable collapses 
multiple issue categories into the following four broad issue areas: military/security, economic, 




For executive agreements, we also code the authority under which the agreement is 
negotiated. This includes previous treaties, congressional legislation, and sole executive 
authority. At present, however, these data remain incomplete. The State Department provides 
very limited information describing the legal and or constitutional justification for executive 
agreements. A later search through the United States Code will be necessary to determine more 
completely and accurately whether agreements are signed pursuant to statutory legislation 




Two further distinctions are provided for in the dataset. The first documents the 
negotiating entity in the treaty or agreement; nation-states, inter-governmental organizations, or 
both. The second variable records simply whether the signed contract is bilateral or multilateral. 
Presumably presidential decisions to use a treaty or executive agreement for establishing a 
foreign commitment is influenced by both the fundamental nature of the negotiating entity and 
the number of these actors involved in the process. In the same way, Senate opposition or 




The empirical evidence presented below concentrates on four broad relationships. First, 
we show the U.S. upper chamber more active and influential on U.S. treaty-making than most 
scholarship acknowledges. Second, we illustrate the shift from treaties to agreements as the 
primary mechanism in tying the U.S. to other countries formally. Third, we observe U.S. 
commitments becoming more geographically dispersed and increasingly focused on economic 
concerns. Fourth, executive agreements appear to be increasingly used for military and security 
commitments. The data also offer hints at the influence Congress has over executive agreements.  
Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate not only that U.S. commitments abroad have increased 
dramatically in the early 21st century compared to the early 20th, but also that these commitments 
 
[Tables 1 & 2 about Here] 
 
are now predominately negotiated using executive agreement without the advice and consent of 
the Senate. From 1901-1909, Roosevelt’s Administration negotiated 97 commitments that went 
to the Senate and 44 that did not. Compare these numbers to Bush’s first term: 45 treaties and 
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612 executive agreements. Yearly averages reinforce this increase in commitment-making. 
Roosevelt averaged 4.87 executive agreements per year and 10.78 treaties, while Bush averaged 
153 executive agreements per year and 11.25 treaties. As is evident, yearly treaties do not change 
all that much comparing administrations from the early 20th and 21st centuries, however, 
commitment-making obviously has increased dramatically and administrations utilize executive 
agreements as the primary mechanism to establish these foreign contracts. 
Security concerns have remained relatively constant in U.S. diplomacy. Nearly 40% of 
the international commitments made by the Roosevelt Administration involved security 
concerns, such as arms control, defense cooperation, international law, and terrorism. For the 
first term of Bush, 42.6% of commitments involved security or military concerns. More 
 
[Table 3 about Here] 
 
interestingly, though, while Roosevelt was much more likely to sign security and military pacts 
with advice and consent of the U.S. Senate, Bush has overwhelmingly chosen to use executive 
agreements for the same purpose. In fact, Roosevelt negotiated 12 (only 21%) security 
arrangements with foreign countries using executive agreement. Bush, in contrast, used 
executive agreements for 98% of the security accords signed.  
 
Senate Influence in Treaty-Making 
 
Auerswald and Maltzman (2003, 1099) argue that “the process of treaty ratification 
formally begins when the president submits a treaty to the Senate for advice and consent.” 
However, like most research evaluating the U.S. Senate’s influence on treaty-making, Auerswald 
and Maltzman only consider Senate reservations to treaties that ultimately received advice and 
consent. Clearly such alterations to treaty documents indicate Senate influence and thus support 
Auerswald and Maltzman’s contention that extant research downplays the role of the Senate in 
foreign policy. Nonetheless, by ignoring the Senate committee stage of the treaty making 
process, Auerswald and Maltzman (2003) also disregard a critical place of Senatorial influence.  
For treaties that eventually went into force, we observe Senate influence on about 30% in 
both administrations. Twenty-nine of 97 treaties during Roosevelt’s presidency show signs of 
 
[Table 4 about Here] 
 
Senate influence, while 12 of 35 treaties during the Bush Administration show similar signs of 
Senate influence. These numbers show two important things. First, one-third of treaties that 
ultimately received the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate were affected by the preferences of 
members of the upper chamber. Second, one-third is a much larger number of treaties than most 
analyses report, although it supports Auerwald’s (2006) findings. Further, when we simply look 
at Senate reservations, understandings, and or amendments to treaties, we actually see signs of 
increasing Senate pressure. Only 8% of treaties during the Roosevelt presidency received Senate 
attachments, while over 30% of the treaties negotiated by the Bush Administration witnessed 
such emendations.  
With treaties in force, Senate influence is likely under-estimated. During the Roosevelt 
Administration, for example, 45 unperfected treaties were negotiated by U.S. authorities. Of 
these treaties, two-thirds show signs of Senate influence. Including the unperfected treaties in the 
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dataset increases the overall impact of the Senate to over 40% of negotiated contracts with 
foreign countries. This represents a 39% increase in the percentage of treaties affected by the 
 
[Tables 5 & 6 about Here] 
 
upper chamber and clearly leads to a different conclusion about the role the Senate plays in treaty 
formation. For example, the U.S. Senate killed 10 arbitration treaties with its amending pen 
during the Roosevelt presidency. These treaties were designed to preserve peace between the 
signatories by providing for arbitration of legal differences that might arise. However, each 
arbitration treaty contained a short, but unacceptable clause enabling the president through 
executive agreement the ability to establish among other things the arbitrator’s powers. The 
Senate struck the word agreement from the treaty and replaced it with treaty, forcefully 
indicating its unwillingness to allow the president, without Senate influence, the power to set 
such rules. The amendment received a bipartisan 50-9 vote in the Senate and thus all 10 
arbitration treaties were so amended. One additional arbitration treaty with Japan was never sent 
to the Senate by Roosevelt owing to the Senate’s actions (Holt 1933, 204). The Republican 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee insisted that “nothing remained for the 
Senate to do by to assert and uphold its right as a party of the treaty-making power” (Cullom, 
399).13  It was also clear to Senators that their amendment would kill the arbitration treaties, 
since Roosevelt had informed the chairman of the foreign relations committee of this precise 
fact.  
The Hay-Bond Treaty between the U.S. and the UK over Newfoundland, signed by the 
Roosevelt Administration in November of 1902, was also killed by the U.S. Senate. It attempted 
to establish a level playing field for commercial interests in the U.S. and Newfoundland. After 
prodding from the Roosevelt Administration, the Senate took up the treaty in 1905, but New 
England fishing interests successfully amended the treaty to death. Unfortunately, public 
officials in Newfoundland used the failed treaty as a justification to punish New England 
fisherman. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge actually demanded that Roosevelt send a U.S. naval 
cruiser to the area to ensure American rights (Holt 1933, 199-200). Here we see the U.S. Senate, 
for domestic political purposes, killing a negotiated treaty not through an up or down vote on the 
Senate floor, but by amending the document in such a way to make it offensive to the other 
party. 
Currently, similar data do not exist for the Bush Administration and so it is difficult to 
assess trends at this time. But, it seems clear that datasets without unperfected treaties not only 
under-count the total number of negotiated compacts by U.S. authorities, these datasets also 
ignore the treaties that illustrate the greatest Senate influence.  
 
Issues and Senate Influence 
 
Data from the Roosevelt and Bush Administrations also show evidence of changing 
issues in U.S. commitment-making. A much larger percentage of the treaties signed by Bush 
 
[Tables 7A & 7B about Here] 
 
                                                 
13 Roosevelt indicated that the Senate’s behavior was “owing to the idiotic jealousy of the Executive which tends to 
make the Senate try to reduce the Executive to impotency” (quote Holt 1933, p. 206). 
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involve economic issues, while fewer involve military/security issues. More importantly, 
however, Senate influence appears much greater on security and military issues. For Roosevelt, 
50% of security treaties that went into force show signs of significant Senate involvement. 
Compare this to only 13% for non-security related treaties. For Bush, all security treaties than 
entered into force received serious Senate attention. Indeed, the Senate attached reservations and 
or amendments to all five security treaties signed by Bush.  
This is not to say that the Senate only attends to issues of high politics. Indeed, the Senate 
demonstrated its power one again when confronted by a treaty negotiated by Roosevelt with the 
Dominican Republic settling debts and obligations. Initially, Roosevelt hoped to avoid the Senate 
by defining the pact an international agreement not subject to advice and consent. Roosevelt 
consistently referred to this deal as a protocol and not a treaty hoping to convince the Senate and 
the public that it need not go through the Senate. The strategy backfired and even Republicans in 
the Senate expressed concern over Roosevelt’s strategy. The treaty never made it out of the 
Foreign Relations Committee since it would not have received the necessary 2/3rds vote on the 
Senate floor. Roosevelt, however, did not admit defeat. He subsequently signed the deal with an 
executive agreement and the Senate agreed to the treaty two years later, although in a 
significantly revised format (Holt 1933).14  
Roosevelt’s experiences in dealing with the Senate when it came to the Dominican 
Republic reflect a more general relationship mentioned above. While Roosevelt was much more 
likely to utilize executive agreements on economic deals, the Bush team has tended to push 
through military/security compacts without seeking the advice and consent of the Senate. We 
 
[Table 8 about Here] 
 
observe nearly 50% of the Bush Administration’s executive agreements dealing with 
military/security issues compared to only 27% of Roosevelt’s. Perhaps the more relevant 
comparison relates to economic contracts. Over 60% of Roosevelt’s executive agreements dealt 
with economic issues compared to only 15% of Bush’s.  
 
Regional Dispersion of Commitments 
 
Table 9 illustrates the geographic focus of U.S. international commitments. The early 20th 
century under the leadership of Roosevelt clearly concentrated U.S. foreign diplomacy on the 
Americas and Europe. Asia, Africa, and the Middle East receive almost no attention whatsoever. 
In the early 21st century, foreign commitments clearly increase dramatically compared to 100 
years earlier, but the geographic spread of U.S. interests also increase. The signing of contracts 
with Asian countries becomes as frequent as commitments to states in Europe, and more 
common that interest shown countries in Central and South America. Africa and the Middle East 
also receive increased attention.  
                                                 
14 Since the treaty with the Dominican Republic was officially still pending in the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and not rejected, Roosevelt could claim he was merely establishing a temporary fix while the Senate 
deliberated on the merits of the signed document. Despite this demonstration of unilateral presidential power, 





We have argued that extant scholarship does not sufficiently address congressional 
influence on U.S. commitment-making. Earlier phases of Senate participation in treaties suggest 
much greater control than simple evaluations of floor decision-making have denoted. Yet, we 
also insist that commitment-making by the U.S. government has shifted over time. The shift not 
only involves the use of one foreign policy tool more than another, but more importantly 
involves a transformation in the interpretation of constitutional authority. Presidents increasingly 
use executive agreements, rather than treaties to negotiate foreign compacts. Nonetheless, 
Congress has fought back and retains influence over most international commitments.  
The evidence presented above demonstrates significant Senate influence on U.S. treaty-
making. One-third of treaties that entered into forced during the Roosevelt and Bush 
Administrations show signs of Senate power. This is much greater when military/security 
compacts are being negotiated. Fifty percent of Roosevelt’s security treaties and 100% of Bush’s 
bear evidence of Senate attention. These numbers, however, under-estimate the role played by 
the upper chamber in commitment-making. For the Roosevelt Administration, 45 treaties 
negotiated by U.S. authorities did not ultimately go into force and two-thirds of these 
commitments were sunk largely due to Senate opposition.  
Our study remains incomplete. But, these initial steps suggest a couple of different paths 
to take for future research. One, it seems obvious and essential that existing datasets on U.S. 
treaties must include ones that did not enter into force. These data are available and likely will 
indicate much greater Senate influence over treaty-making than one can establish with only 
treaties that received advice and consent. Second, any research on U.S. international 
commitments must address executive agreements. These signed contracts with other countries 
are treaties according to international law. More importantly, though, more attention must be 
given to the legal authority under which these agreements are signed. We are unable to yet 
comment on whether presidents increasingly sign executive agreements under sole executive 
authority or whether Congress continues to authorize such pacts through statutes. But we can say 
that such a distinction must be made in any attempt to assess the relative power in commitment-
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TABLE 1: Treaties and Executive Agreements Concluded by the United States during the 








Roosevelt  (26) 97 44 
Bush (43) 45 612 
Total 142 656 
 
 
TABLE 2: Treaties and Executive Agreements Concluded Annually by the United States during 








1901 3 2 
1902 10 5 
1903 10 7 
1904 13 0 
1905 9 9 
1906 9 8 
1907 14 7 
1908 24 3 
1909 5 3 
2001 9 111 
2002 9 132 
2003 16 174 
2004 4 195 
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Note: This table excludes the 45 unperfected treaties during the Roosevelt administration, most 
of which show signs of Senate influence.  
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Note: This table excludes the 20 unperfected non-security treaties during the Roosevelt 
administration, most of which show signs of Senate influence. 
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Note: This table excludes 25 unperfected security treaties during the Roosevelt administration, 
most of which show signs of Senate influence. 
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